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The Role of the Civil Jury in a
System of Private Litigation
George L. Priestt

This paper attempts to examine critically the role of the civil
jury by determining what functions it actually serves in the American system of justice. The civil jury is an institution of distinctive
importance in American society. The United States employs the
lay jury to adjudicate civil claims to an extent far greater than any
other modern nation. And because our rules provide jury election
to either litigant, the civil jury defines the substance of liability for
all civil disputes: directly, for cases litigated to judgment; and
through potential recourse, for cases settled out of court. Moreover, beyond its utility as an instrument of claims resolution, the
civil jury occupies a central political role in our democratic society.
The civil jury is widely viewed as establishing a critical popular
counterforce to governmental control of law enforcement and engendering a sense of citizenship and commitment to the rule of
law.
Yet, despite the civil jury's administrative and political importance, there has been little critical joinder in recent years over either the civil jury's direction or the magnitude of its duties. There
has been widespread approval of the civil jury as an institution for
claims adjudication. The particular features of the jury's composition-12 persons, lay citizens, chosen randomly from the population-are frequently invoked to justify the civil jury as the institution best suited to resolve particularly vexing legal disputes. But
there has been little attention given to whether the types of disputes that the civil jury actually faces correspond to the types of
disputes for which this method of decisionmaking is most appropriate, and equally little attention to the broader implications of
delegating all civil disputes to juries in our increasingly litigious
times.
t John M. Olin Professor of Law and Economics and Director, Program in Civil Liability, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Karen Crocco and Stacie East for research assistance,
Paul McGuire for programming help, participants of workshops at Harvard, Columbia and
Michigan law schools for comments, and the Program in Civil Liability for support.
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Similarly, virtually all of the literature evaluating the jury concedes its importance as a democratic institution of government.
The constitutional delegation to lay citizens of the authority to define the implementation of civil and criminal justice is viewed as
closely allied to the right to vote as popular control of the law. Yet,
although the role of the criminal jury in protecting citizens from
the arbitrary exercise of governmental power has received extensive study,1 the political role of the civil jury has been largely neglected. There has been little careful analysis of the extent to
which the civil jury is called upon to resolve disputes involving the
exercise of governmental power. As a consequence, we possess only
a dim understanding of the relative importance of the civil jury
among our society's political institutions.
The absence of rigorous analysis stems from an extraordinary
national consensus on the merits of the civil jury. Both the administrative and political roles of the civil jury have been celebrated
since the earliest years of the Republic.2 Over the past quarter century, however, support for the civil jury has become nearly unanimous. In large part, the overwhelming modern belief in the importance of the civil jury can be attributed to the influential work of
the University of Chicago Jury Project led by Harry Kalven and
Hans Zeisel. In its time, the Kalven-Zeisel Jury Project was the
most ambitious empirical study of jury decisionmaking that had
ever been attempted.' As a result of their extensive empirical analysis, the authors claimed that the civil jury was a superior institution for adjudicating disputes involving complex societal values,"
that the jury served as an important instrument of popular control
over law enforcement,5 and that the jury brought a superior sense
of social equity to the decisionmaking process. Indeed, the authors
interpreted their empirical findings to confirm simultaneously each
of these assertions. Kalven and Zeisel discovered from judicial
polls that judges agreed on outcomes reached by both civil and
criminal juries in roughly 80 percent of the cases and disagreed in
For discussions of criminal jury nullification, see Harry Kalven, Jr., and Hans Zeisel,
The American Jury 310-12 (Little, Brown & Co., 1966).
See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1850 ed) 270-76
(Anchor Books, 1969). For more recent praise, see Sir Patrick Devlin, Trial by Jury (Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1956).
' For a bibliography of the Chicago Jury Project, see Kalven & Zeisel, The American
Jury at 541-45.
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19
Ohio St L J 158 (1958); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 Va L Rev 1055
(1964).
Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at 1065-66.
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only 20 percent.6 Kalven and Zeisel interpreted this 80 percent
agreement as confirming evidence of the overall aptitude of lay
jury decisionmaking, 7 and interpreted the 20 percent disagreement
as confirming evidence of the jury's role as a democratic
counterforce to state authority.8 In addition, Kalven and Zeisel
found that civil juries awarded damages that were, on average, 20
percent greater than judicial awards. They interpreted this as confirming evidence of the jury's comparatively greater sense of equity.9 Clothed in Harry Kalven's brilliant rhetoric,10 conclusions
such as these removed the civil jury from the range of criticism for
more than a generation.
The success of the Kalven-Zeisel defense of the civil jury has
been so complete that, despite a great increase in sophisticated
analysis of other legal institutions over the past quarter century,
critical focus on the civil jury has remained diffused. Analysis of
the civil jury has consisted of little more than inspection at the
edges of what is accepted as a largely perfected institution. For
example, the most important modern research on the jury addresses issues such as whether jury size should be 12 or a number
slightly less1" or how to refine jury representativeness. 2 To date,
the strongest form of jury "criticism" has been the supposition
that there may exist some limited set of cases involving exceptional
scientific complexity that would exceed the capacity of lay jurors. 3
These questions are not insignificant, but they presuppose without
question that the jury will continue to perform almost exactly the
functions that it performs today. Thus modern jury research falls
far short of a fundamental reexamination characteristic of research

Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury at 58 (cited in note 1); Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at
1064-65. Kalven and Zeisel never attempted to explain their incredible finding of nearly
equivalent judge-jury agreement in civil and criminal cases. The finding suggests either a
deeper interactive relationship between judge and jury or some peculiar feature of judicial
responses to the questionnaires.
Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury at 151-52; Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at 1064-66.
Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury at 494-96; Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at 1065-66.
Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at 1065-66.
See, for example, Harry Kalven's description: "The jury is almost by definition an
exciting and gallant experiment in the conduct of serious human affairs ....
Id at 1055.
"1 See, for example, Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 165-76 (Plenum Press, 1986).
11 Id at 49-57.
" This literature is reviewed in Paul Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U Chi Legal F 33.
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on judicial decisionmaking" or on the political roles of equivalent
institutions, such as the legislative or executive branches. 5 Indeed,
as a consequence of the Kalven-Zeisel triumph, modern literature
on the civil jury resembles less a careful empirical scrutiny than a
form of aspirational mythology, describing society's hopes for the
civil jury more than what the jury's role actually is or has been.
It is not obvious that an institution as fundamental as the civil
jury should command a position of such critical invulnerability.
Three decades ago, as Kalven and Zeisel were beginning the Chicago Project, they detected more serious concerns about the civil
jury's modern role. From their earliest empirical inquiries, Kalven
and Zeisel saw that the institution of the civil jury was heavily implicated in the pressing problem of court congestion and litigation
delay. Kalven and Zeisel feared that public concern about delay in
the administration of justice would generate proposals to take
cases away from the civil jury.'6 Anticipating this challenge, they
addressed their first extended study to the problem of delay, 7 and
concluded that litigation delay could be eliminated-without impairing the role of the jury-if courts both were expanded and
were to institute comprehensive management reforms.' 8 Their program was doubly successful. Their proposals for court expansion
and case management reform have been implemented broadly
throughout the country during the last three decades.' 9 In addition, criticism of the civil jury as a contributing source of litigation
delay has been largely suppressed. 0 The dominant modern ap" See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform
(Harvard University Press, 1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95
Harv L Rev 802 (1982).
" See, for example, Jose Edgardo L. Campos, Legislative Institutions, Lobbying, and
the Endogenous Choice of Regulatory Instruments: A Political Economy Approach to Instrument Choice, 5 J L Econ & Org 333 (1989).
"6Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at 1058-59 (cited in note 4); Zeisel, The Jury and Court Delay,
328 Ann Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 46, 47 (1960).
'7 Hans Zeisel, Harry Kalven, Jr., and Bernard Buchholz, Delay in the Court (Little,
Brown & Co., 1959).
18 See, generally, id; Zeisel, 328 Ann Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 46. For further discussion
of the Kalven-Zeisel-Buchholz analysis of delay, see text accompanying notes 86-93. I previously reviewed their reform proposals in George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court
Congestion Problem, 69 BU L Rev 527, 528-29 (1989).
" For the history of attempted reforms to reduce congestion in the Illinois courts, see
Priest, 69 BU L Rev at 544-48. For other reform proposals, see National Center for State
Courts, On Trial: The Length of Civil and Criminal Trials 65-83 (1988).
20 See, for example, the studies of court delay by the National Center for State Courts
("NCSC"), which only briefly consider the existence of the civil jury as a contributing source
of litigation delay. NCSC, Examining Court Delay: The Pace of Litigation in Twenty-Six
Urban Trial Courts, 1987 23-25 (1989) (dismissing the jury as a source of delay on grounds
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proach toward the court congestion problem attributes differences
in delay across jurisdictions to differences in "established expectations, practices, and informal rules of behavior of judges and attorneys[:] . . . 'local legal culture,' "21 cultures that, in all jurisdictions,
accept the institution of the civil jury as beyond question.
Yet, despite the widespread acceptance and adoption of the
Kalven-Zeisel proposals for case management reform, the problem
of civil litigation delay has not disappeared. Indeed, in most urban
jurisdictions, it has progressively worsened.22 There are strong reasons to believe that litigation delay is endemic to civil jury litigation and cannot be substantially resolved by either massive increases in the judiciary or draconian amendments to casemanagement procedures.2 s Thus the role of the civil jury in modern law enforcement, as well as the link between the jury and litigation delay, compels modern reexamination.
This paper begins that effort with an empirical examination of
the types of disputes the civil jury actually faces in a modern urban. trial court: the Cook County, Illinois, civil courts from 1959
through 1979. As we shall see, the dominant understanding of the
justifiable role of the civil jury-as an institution for the resolution
of disputes involving complex societal values and as a popular
democratic counterforce-describes very few of the actual tasks of
the modern civil jury. At the most basic level, these descriptions of
the jury are seriously incomplete. Both portray the civil jury as an
institution to which our society consciously delegates the resolution of a particular set of disputes. This view, however, ignores the
fact that in the American system of civil litigation disputes are
chosen for jury resolution less by conscious constitutional or legislative mandate than by default when private litigants are unable to
settle their disputes prior to trial. There is a growing literature
showing the importance of the private, decentralized litigation-

that there is no clear relationship across jurisdictions between delay and the percent of total
cases reaching juries). For a description of the economic determinants of the extent of delay
across jurisdictions, see Priest, 69 BU L Rev at 537-39.
" NCSC, Pace of Litigation at 53-54.
" Id at 44, table 7 (showing increases in tort filing-to-disposition time in ten of 16
urban jurisdictions from 1976-87). See also the comment of Cook County, Illinois Chief
Judge Harry G. Comerford to the Cook County Board that "he needs 130-140 new courtrooms, at a cost as high as $500 million, and 50-60 more judges because of mushrooming
caseload .. " Charles Mount, "Collar Counties Cutting Court Backlogs," Chicago Tribune
C1 (May 30, 1989). 1 am grateful to Geoffrey P. Miller for this information.
22 See, generally, Priest, 69 BU L Rev 527 (describing economic forces creating court
congestion equilibrium). For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 93-107.
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settlement process to the selection of those disputes ultimately
tried to juries in America.24
Of course, state and federal constitutions and statutes define
the broad set of disputes available for civil jury resolution. But, in
our society, no more than three to four percent of civil claims are
ever tried to juries.2 5 It is an important question whether the most
dominant determinant of the administrative and political role that
the civil jury actually plays is the common and statutory law defining the universe of disputes, or the private parties that select from
that universe the three or four percent of cases acutally tried to
juries. The modern literature on the civil jury is innocent of this
perspective.
Part I of this Article reviews the modern literature on the role
of the jury, attempting to define with greater specificity those disputes for which the civil jury has been regarded as a superior adjudicator or for which the civil jury serves an important political purpose. Part II examines the extent to which civil juries in Cook
County, Illinois actually served these functions during the two decades between 1959 and 1979. Part III, then, describes the influence of private party litigation-settlement decisions on the functions that the civil jury is called upon to serve, and explains why
the promiscuous delegation of all potential civil litigation to the
jury is the most likely source of continuing civil trial delay. This
review implies that there are few defensible grounds upon which to
support unlimited recourse to a jury for all civil litigation and, conversely, strong grounds upon which to conclude that the quality of
civil justice in America would be dramatically improved by sharp
restrictions on civil jury jurisdiction.

I.

THE FUNCTIONS BEST SERVED BY THE CIVIL JURY

In the long history of discussion about the relative merits of
judge versus jury decisionmaking in civil litigation, 6 there is widespread consensus that the institution of the jury is particularly appropriate for the resolution of two sets of cases: those involving
damage measurements that implicate complex societal values, and
24 See, for example, George L. Priest, Selective Characteristicsof Litigation,9 J Legal
Stud 399 (1980); George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J Legal Stud 1 (1984). Much of this literature is reviewed in Robert D. Cooter
and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J
Econ Lit 1067 (1989).
"5 Priest, 69 BU L Rev at 540, Table 1 (cited in note 18).
"6See sources cited in notes 1 and 2.
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those. with overt political content, pitting the government against
an individual citizen in the context of civil liability.
Harry Kalven's discussion of the civil jury as an adjudicative
institution has been particularly prominent. 7 Kalven defined the
tasks appropriate for the civil jury by reverse inference: by inquiring which legal issues are best decided by an institution whose
principal characteristics are that it is composed of 12 lay citizens,
chosen randomly from the population, called together to decide
one case and then dispersed.2 According to Kalven, the civil jury
is essential because some disputes will necessarily arise where the
application of "the community sense of values" is especially important.2' Lay citizens, untrained in law, bring to such decisions a
closer "feel of the community" and of its standards.3 0 Indeed, the
professional training and consequent discipline of a trial judge
might be counterproductive for such disputes.3 1 More generally, a
lay jury may be far more able than a judge to apply societal values
in such a manner as to add flexibility to the application of the
law.32 A jury, unlike a judge or legislature, can "legislate interstitially," particularly with respect to questions involving complex
value judgments. 3
Other institutional features of the civil jury serve complementary purposes. Random selection of jurors, rather than the selection of volunteers or of community leaders, ensures that diverse
aspects of community sensibility will be considered."' In addition,
the representative character of the jury, combined with the procedure that calls for its members to terminate their judicial duties
and return to their normal positions in society, allows the jury to
deflect societal criticism that might otherwise be damagingly concentrated on a continuously sitting judge.3 5 In this way, the jury
acts as a "lightning rod for animosity and suspicion" of socially
necessary, but troubling, judgments.3 6 Finally, a jury of 12 introduces greater common sense to the decisionmaking process be-

27 Kalven, 19 Ohio St L J at 161 (cited in note 4); Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at 1058, 1061-68
(cited in note 4).
28 Kalven, 19 Ohio St L J at 161.
29
80
"
32

Id.
Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at 1058.
Id; Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury at 8 (cited in note 1).
Id at 8-9.
Id; Kalven, 19 Ohio St L J at 161.
13
Moreover, 12 persons are less corruptible than one person. Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at

1062.
35 Id.
38 Id; Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury at 7 (cited in.note 1).
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cause the judgment of 12 persons is generally superior to the judgment of a single person. 7
Kalven's general view that jury decision is most appropriate
for issues involving complex societal values has been elaborated by
Guido Calabresi in his prominent book, Tragic Choices.3 8 A tragic
choice to Dean Calabresi is a selection, sometimes compelled in a
complex society, from among alternatives all of which are difficult
or impossible according to some widely accepted moral vision. 9
For example, the allocation of an insufficient number of kidney dialysis machines compels a tragic choice because the assignment of
the machine to one patient necessarily implies the otherwise unacceptable decision to allow other patients to die from renal failure.4
Dean Calabresi argues that the lay jury is a particularly appropriate institution for making tragic decisions of this nature."' Calabresi regards the civil jury as prototypical of what he calls a "decentralized," "representative," "discontinuous," "aresponsible"
agency;42 on these grounds, it possesses an authority and a decisionmaking freedom unavailable to other adjudicative institutions.
The jury is decentralized because it is composed of laypersons; it is
societally representative because its members are chosen randomly;
it is discontinuous because it disbands after rendering a single decision; and it is aresponsible because it gives no reasons for its decisions and cannot be overruled absent gross error. Dean Calabresi
argues that these features in combination allow the civil jury to
render decisions in tragic circumstances in a way impossible for
professional, continuous, or more formally responsible governmental institutions.
The jury's representativeness and lack of responsibility
. . . [are] the source of the characteristic and powerful
way in which the jury operates. . . [and] why certain decisions are committed to it.... Juries apply societal standards without ever telling us what these standards are, or
even that they exist. This is especially important in those

Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at 1067; Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury at 8. Kalven's
formulation has had exceptional influence on the current understanding of the role of the
jury. See, for example, Fleming James, Jr., and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Civil Procedure 42829 (Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed 1985) (adopting in its entirety the Kalven formulation of the
justification of the civil jury).
38 Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices (W.W. Norton & Co., 1978).
Id at 17-19.
Id at 186-89.
41 Calabresi & Bobbitt, Tragic Choices at 57-64.
"

Id.
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situations in which the statement of standards would be
terribly destructive."3
According to these views, which kinds of disputes should the
civil jury be deciding in modern society? Despite Professor
Kalven's helpful general theory of civil jury responsibility, he unfortunately never provided a list of more specific tasks. Kalven
claimed vaguely that the civil jury's "feel of the community" and
sensitivity to social situations was important for its determination
of what actions constituted ordinary negligence." On similar
grounds, he defended jury definitions of substantive liability in
defamation disputes, presumably because a jury could better evaluate the impact of a defamatory statement on a litigant's reputation within the community."'
Kalven gave greater attention to the civil jury as an institution
for measuring damages. He admitted that most personal injury
damages calculations consisted of routine summing of the basic
damages elements: medical expenses, lost income and pain and
suffering. He strongly argued, however, that decision by civil jury
was needed where any of these elements implicated a complex societal value judgment.4 ' He claimed, for example, that the calculation of pain and suffering damages in disfigurement cases required
a feel of the community and a sensitivity to social situations. 7 He
also emphasized other cases in which the calculation of economic
loss might be inherently difficult-such as where the victim had no
market earnings-giving as examples a housekeeper4 1 or a child. A
jury's unique sensitivity would be desirable, for example, in a case
where a child had been killed and the normal standard for wrongful death awards-loss of support-might seem inappropriate."'
Dean Calabresi's treatment of the role of the civil jury adds
some greater precision to this definition. Calabresi's best and most
frequent example of the defensible role of the lay jury-the allocation of kidney dialysis machines-is today most commonly served
by special juries convened to advise hospitals compelled to allocate
such machines, not by civil trial juries. But Calabresi's emphasis
on the special role of the lay jury in rendering decisions in "tragic"
" Id at 57.

" Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at 1058, 1071-72 (cited in note 4).
" Id at 1071.
" See, generally, Kalven, 19 Ohio St L J at 160-61 (cited in note 4).
" Id at 161.
48

Id.

" Kalven, 19 Ohio St L J at 167-69.
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circumstances seems to express more carefully what Professor
Kalven had in mind when he referred to the jury's role in decisions
involving "complex value judgments," where application of the
"community sense of values ''5 is important. An illustration of the
Kalven-Calabresi point is the calculation of pain and suffering
damages for victims who have suffered catastrophic loss. Here the
calculation of dollars for purposes of a civil judgment necessarily
implicates an evaluation of the "value" of life or of some substantial portion of life. In such cases, it may well be argued that a civil
jury is superior institutionally to a judge because the judgment is
made by a group of lay citizens with discontinuous existence, acting without formal responsibility. Kalven's examples of the social
judgments inherent in calculating the value of lost productivity to
housekeepers or children are closely consistent with this
interpretation.
In this view, the civil jury is a superior adjudicative institution
for defining liability and evaluating damages in contexts implicating complex or conflicting societal values. Many aspects of the
work of a factfinder in civil litigation require judgments that are in
some sense difficult, either because there is no empirical or conceptual basis for them, such as judgments about pain and suffering, or
because they involve projections into the future, such as estimates
of future lost income or future medical costs. According to the
Kalven-Calabresi approach, however, it is not the difficulty of a
judgment per se that commends the institution of the civil jury,
but the appropriateness of resolving the difficult judgment by the
application of broad societal values. Where broad or conflicting societal values are implicated, the convening of a democratic institution such as a civil jury may be especially important.
The second function of the civil jury-as a democratic
counterforce to state authority-has received less attention. Of
course, the criminal jury is relatively more important than the civil
jury in this capacity, since the criminal jury is the chief bulwark
protecting citizens from arbitrary or unlawful state prosecution.
The civil jury might be expected to serve a complementary function, however, first in suits in which the government exercises authority through civil litigation-such as condemnation actions-and, second, where the government is a defendant in suits
brought by citizens claiming to have been harmed by governmental
action. Indeed, this role of the civil jury has surely increased over

50

Id at 161.
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time as the governmental immunities have been waived or restricted and as courts have expanded opportunities for citizens to
sue for due process violations. Probably of greatest modern significance are suits claiming damages for false arrest, false imprisonment or assault by a law enforcement officer. In contexts such as
these, the democratic features of jury selection provide a forum in
which the civil jury's determination of the appropriateness of liability and the measurement of damages can discipline and constrain arbitrary or unlawful behavior by government employees or
agencies.
The final function attributed to the civil jury-also the most
vague and least amenable to precise analysis-is the role of civil
jury service in educating citizens about the operation and importance of the rule of law. The celebration of the jury's role in
achieving this end derives from Tocqueville, who, summing up his
study of Democracy in America, concluded that "the main reason
for the practical intelligence and the political good sense of the
Americans is their long experience with juries in civil cases." 1
Tocqueville's admiration for civil jury service was unbounded:
"civil juries . . . instill some of the habits of the judicial mind into
every citizen"; "[spread] respect for the courts' decisions and for
the idea of right throughout all classes"; "teach men equity in
practice"; "make all men feel that they have duties toward society
and that they take a share in government"; and "are wonderfully
effective in shaping a nation's judgment and increasing its natural
lights."52
Since Tocqueville, the importance of the civil jury's role in ed-5
ucating citizens has been endorsed by virtually all commentators,
indeed, even by those seemingly hostile to the jury. 4 Some have
complained that this education of the citizenry comes at too high a
cost in terms of the lost productivity of sitting jurors, 55 but the
point does not contest the existence of educative benefits. Moreover, Kalven studied the reaction of jurors themselves to jury ser" Tocqueville, Democracy in America at 275 (cited in note 2).
"

Id at 274-75.

" See, for example, Charles P. Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, 5 Vand L Rev
150, 157 (1952).
, See Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?,21 U Chi L Rev
386, 419-21 (1954) (accepting educative role, but arguing that it comes at the expense of
litigants who deserve professional judgments). Note, however, that Broeder's criticism of the
jury appears disingenuous; the article is written as a devil's advocate exercise to summon all
possible criticisms of the jury. Broeder was a prominent contributor to the University of
Chicago Jury Project.
"
Donald L. Martin, The Economics of Juror Conscription,80 J Pol Econ 680 (1972).
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vice and found that, despite lost wages and occasional complaints
about inefficient administration, civil jury service was "very often a
80
'
major and moving experience in the life of the citizen-juror.
The next part presents empirical evidence describing how
these various justifications for civil jury decisionmaking correspond
to the actual role of the jury in modern civil adjudication.
II.

WHAT THE CIVIL JURY ACTUALLY DOES

The following tables report the work of the Cook County, Illinois (Chicago metropolitan area) civil jury courts from 1959 to
1979. The data were compiled from the Cook County Jury Verdict
Reporter, a weekly newsletter describing all cases tried to juries in
the Cook County courts. 7 The tables in sections A and B report
both total numbers of cases and total juror time in days for specific
civil casetypes. The trial length calculation includes the time required for jury deliberation; I am not able to distinguish.trial from
deliberation time. Section C addresses the significance of jury service as a civic experience. To my knowledge, there are no studies of
comparable detail describing the civil jury caseload nor relative juror time by casetype.
Some aggregate figures suggest the magnitude of civil jury responsibilities. For the 21-year period of the sample, jurors resolved
16,984 cases.58 These cases required jurors to sit, in aggregate,
769,188 juror days. At 250 working days per year, civil jurors in
Chicago spent well over 3000 working years (on average, 142 juror
working years per year) adjudicating civil disputes.
A.

The Civil Jury's Burden in Cases Implicating Complex
or Conflicting Societal Values

Table 1 reports all casetypes from the sample that might be
characterized as involving damages issues requiring the jury to
evaluate complex or conflicting societal values. Column 1 presents
the categories of underlying injuries and column 2, the aggregate
number of such cases resolved by civil juries over the period. ColKalven, 50 Va L Rev at 1062 (cited in note 4).
"7The data were collected by the author with support from the RAND Corporation's
Institute for Civil Justice. For a detailed description of the data, see Mark Peterson and
George L. Priest, The Civil Jury: Trends in Trials and Verdicts, Cook County Illinois,
1960-1979 (R-2881-ICS) (RAND Corp., 1982).
8 The full sample includes 17,478 cases. Cases dismissed or resolved by motion after a
jury was convened are excluded.
66
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umn 3 shows average trial length in days for each injury category."
Column 4 presents the aggregate time jurors spent on such cases,
and column 5 calculates time as a percentage of aggregate juror
investment.
Rows 1 and 2 describe libel and slander cases in the Chicago
courts, cases that Harry Kalven thought particularly appropriate
for civil jury resolution because of juror sensitivity to the effect of
the defendant's act on the plaintiff's reputation in the community.6 0 Column 5 shows that, over the 21-year period, jurors devoted .17 percent and .09 percent of time, respectively, to the resolution of libel and slander cases.
Rows 3-22 describe cases sent to juries involving serious personal injury short of death,61 where setting a dollar amount for the
loss might implicate a societal judgment on either the value of life
or of some significant feature of life. Rows 3 and 4 present cases
involving catastrophic injury, and rows 5 and 6, permanent brain
damage and permanent total disability. Rows 7-12 describe cases
in which the victim suffered some form of amputation or loss of an
eye; rows 13-16, paralysis; rows 17-18, skull and neck fractures;
rows 19-21, head and facial scars and cuts; and row 22, burns over
significant body areas. Rows 23-27 report death actions, and row
28, actions for loss of consortium.
Column 3 of the Table shows that almost all categories of
cases implicating complex damages calculations required an average trial length substantially longer than the 3.8 day mean for the
sample as a whole. Row 3, for example, shows that in cases in
which the claimant was rendered quadriplegic, mean trial length
was 12.7 days, more than three times greater than the sample average. Cases involving hemiplegic victims (row 4) required 8.8 days
on average, less time than for quadriplegics, yet still more than
twice the sample average. These relationships are consistent with
the general expectation that, presuming liability issues to be randomly associated with injury severity, cases compelling the calcula-

The underlying data report only the dates that trial began and that the jury verdict
was rendered. I report the difference.This method exaggerates the length of part-day trials.
I attempted to adjust for the reporting problem by subtracting separately one and two days
from each case. The relative proportions of time for the various case categories reported in
Tables 1 through 5 are not substantially affected by these adjustments.
"0 Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at 1071.
"1 For each case, the injury listed was described as the most serious injury that the
plaintiff suffered.
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Table 1: Juror Time in Damages Cases Involving Complex Values
Cook County, Illinois, 1959-79
(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Injury

# Cases

Mean
Trial
Length,
Days

Total
Juror
Days

Percent
of
Grand
Total

All Cases

16,984

3.8

769,188

100.00

24
18

4.7
3.3

1,344
720

.17
.09

17
5
128
67
17
14
37
5
65
10
14
5
3
6
287
54
29
151
353
24
152
5
9
5
1
248

12.7
8.8
8.7
7.4
10.6
7.6
9.9
5.8
6.3
10.4
6.6
9.2
6.7
4.3
5.0
5.1
39.3
3.5
3.3
6.2
4.8
5.4
3.8
2.4
6.0
5.1

2,592
528
13,416
5,988
2,160
1,284
4,380
348
4,908
1,248
1,116
552
240
312
17,172
3,312
13,680
6,276
13,932
1,776
8,772
324
408
144
72
15,192

.34
.07
1.74
.78
.28
.17
.57
.05
.63
.16
.15
.07
.03
.04
2.23
.43
1.78
.82
1.81
.23
1.14
.04
.05
.02
.01
1.98

(1)

(1)
(2)

Libel
Slander

Personal Iniury:
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)

Quadriplegic
Hemiplegic
Perm. Brain Damage
Perm. Total Disab.
Amput. Arm
Amput. Hand
Amput. Leg
Amput. Foot
Loss, 1 Eye
Loss, 2 Eyes
Paralysis Arm
Paralysis Hand
Paralysis Leg
Paralysis, 2 Legs
Fracture, Head
Fracture, Neck
Scarring, Head
Scarring, Face
Facial Cut
Burn, Entire Body
Death, Child
Death, Housekeeper
Death, Student
Death, Retiree
Death, Unemployed
Loss Consortium

Source: Derived by author from Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter.
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tion of damages for injuries that have seriously disrupted a life are
likely to require more time for trial and jury deliberation than
cases involving more routine injuries.
Though average juror time was substantially greater than the
average for all cases, column 5 of the Table shows that, for almost
all injury and death casetypes, the aggregate proportion of juror
time was relatively small. For example, civil jurors spent only .34
percent of total juror time in quadriplegia cases (row 3) and .07
percent in hemiplegia cases (row 4). Among the injury categories,
the greatest proportion of juror time was spent in cases involving
claims of head fractures (2.23 percent, row 17), facial cuts (1.81
percent, row 21), scarring of the head (1.78 percent, row 19), and
permanent brain damage (1.74 percent, row 5).
Rows 23-27 show cases involving the deaths of individuals
without market incomes. As described earlier, Harry Kalven believed that the civil jury was superior to a judge for calculating
damages in these cases because it could better define society's
views of the "value" of the victims' productivity losses.2 Though
Kalven only applied the analysis to cases involving the death of
housekeepers and children, I have broadened the category to include all victims without market incomes."
Row 23 indicates that, over the 21-year period, juries heard
152 cases involving deaths of children, requiring 8772 juror days,
equal to 1.14 percent of total juror time. Row 24 shows that, over
this period, juries decided only five cases involving the death of
housekeepers, equivalent to .04 percent of total juror time. Rows
25-27 indicate that civil juries spent .05 percent of time adjudicating cases involving the death of students; .02 percent, the death of
retirees; and .01 percent (due to rounding up), the death of persons
unemployed. Finally, row 28 describes cases involving claims of
loss of consortium, included because of the complicated societal
judgment implicated in valuing damage to a relationship. The 248
consortium cases over the period required 15,192 juror days, equal
to 1.98 percent of total juror time. This figure, however, is surely
an exaggeration, since consortium actions are usually joined with
the action of the principal victim. I am unable to determine how
62 See text at notes 46-49; Kalven, 19 Ohio St L J at 161, 167-69 (cited- in note 4).
63

My expanded definition may be too broad. Note that cases involving the death of

retirees (row 26) require on average only 2.4 days, less than the average for the sample as a
whole. Though such individuals lacked market incomes at the time of death, previous market experience may preclude the necessity of making complex value judgments about the
economic loss suffered by dependents in cases involving the death of children or
housekeepers.
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much of trial or deliberation time was allocated to the consortium
count.
The striking feature of Table 1, of course, is the relatively
small amount of aggregate juror time devoted to cases involving
complex or conflicting damages value judgments. Again, the data
presented in Table 1 were selected to correspond most faithfully to
the casetypes that Kalven and Calabresi suggested might implicate
complex or conflicting societal values, those casetypes for which
the special characteristics of the civil jury-nonprofessional, representative, discontinuous, and aresponsible-are most justified. Yet
the civil jury in Chicago was required to spend more than one percent of its aggregate time for only six of the 28 categories of the
Table. Undoubtedly, the small numbers of cases reported in column 2 reflect-fortunately-that the underlying numbers of catastrophic or serious personal injuries that occur in society are
small."' In addition, of course, the more precisely individual case
categories are disaggregated, the smaller individual percentages
will appear (though see Tables 2 and 5). Yet even adding all of the
case categories in Table 1 together (though some are overinclusive), civil juries spent 15.88 percent of their time on cases potentially implicating complex or conflicting damages value judgments.
If cases involving complex societal values comprise a relatively
small proportion of the civil jury caseload, where does the jury
spend its time in damages determination? Table 2 presents those
injuries for which damages determinations required the greatest
percentage of juror time. 5 The injury categories are arranged in
descending order of the magnitude of juror days. I report all individual injury categories requiring more than two percent of aggregate juror time.
Row 1 shows that the injury category on which jurors spent
the greatest aggregate time was a single broken leg. Over the 21year period, 1184 cases were tried to civil juries in which a single
broken leg was the most serious claimed injury, requiring 60,936
juror days (equal to 244 juror years), comprising 7.92 percent of
total juror time.
Row 2 shows that whiplash cases were actually more numerous
than single broken leg cases (1739 cases), but required slightly less
aggregate juror time: 60,216 juror days (241 juror years), equal to
64 Of course, not all catastrophic injuries nor deaths to non-market participants will
generate litigation.
*' Again, I report for each case only the most serious injury claimed by the plaintiff.
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Table 2: Juror Time in Most Frequent Damages Cases,
Complex Values
Cook County, Illinois, 1959-79
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Injury

# Cases

Mean
Trial
Length,
Days

Total
Juror
Days

Percent
of
Grand
Total

All Cases

16,984

3.8

769,188

100.00

(1)

Fracture, 1 leg

1,184

4.3

60,936

7.92

(2)

Whiplash

1,739

2.9

60,216

7.83

(3)

Strain, back

1,007

30

36,780

4.78

(4)

Strain, neck

899

3.2

34,356

4.47

(5)

Fracture, back

588

4.9

32,784

4.26

(6)

Fracture, 1 arm

475

4.1

23,028

2.99

(7).

Fracture, head

287

5.0

17,172

2.23

(8)

Fracture, 1 foot

322

4.2

16,044

2.09

Source: Derived by author from Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter.
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7.83 percent of the Chicago civil jury's total workload. The remaining rows show that other fracture cases as well as cases involving
neck and back strains were also voluminous.6 6 The only potentially
serious injury among the group is head fractures (row 7), which
required 2.23 percent of total juror time.
The disaggregated character of the focus on individual specific
injuries in Tables 1 and 2, however, disguises broader features of
the allocation of juror time. In Table 3, I have attempted to aggregate specific case categories into more generic injury types to present a broader perspective on civil jury damages calculation. Rows
1-10 in Table 3 present summaries of cases where the damages calculation might be thought to implicate complex or conflicting societal values, and rows 11-16, truly routine damages categories.
Row 1, for example, adds together the case categories of the
sample dealing with the necessity of evaluating reputation within
the community. It shows that libel and slander cases in aggregate
comprised .26 percent of total juror time. Row 2 shows a summary
of cases involving catastrophic injury, including quadriplegia and
hemiplegia, cases in which the victim was rendered comatose, and
in which there were claims of permanent brain damage or permanent total disability. In aggregate, catastrophic injury cases required slightly less than 3 percent of total juror time.
Rows 3-6 extend substantially beyond the injury categories reported in Table 1 to attempt to dispel concerns that the categories
listed earlier were underinclusive of cases implicating complex or
conflicting societal values. Row 3 shows all cases involving a claim
of either amputation of any body part or loss of an organ. Row 4
shows claims of paralysis to any portion of the body; row 5, all
head or neck fractures; 7 and row 6, all claims involving scars or
cuts to the head or face. Of course, individuals will interpret differently the meaning of "complex and conflicting societal values," but
the figures listed here must be overestimations. For example, it is
not clear that Harry Kalven's view of the important role of the
civil jury as a "lightning rod for animosity,"6 or Guido Calabresi's
advocacy of the importance of the civil jury in contexts of tragic
judgments, would be extended to the jury resolutions of the 82
" Whiplash reported in row 2 is a neck and back strain suffered in a rear-end accident.
The neck and back strains reported in rows 3 and 4 were suffered in non-rear-end accident
contexts.
" Row 5 includes the head fractures reported at Table 2, row 7.
68 Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at 1062 (cited in note 4), discussed in text accompanying notes
35-36.
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Table 3: Juror Time in Damages Cases-Summary,
Cook County, -Illinois, 1959-79

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Injury

# Cases

Mean
Trial
Length,
Days

Total
Juror
Days

Percent
of
Grand
Total

All Cases
Complex Values:
(1) Libel, slander
(2) Quad., hem.,
perm. damage
(3) Amput. or loss,
any body part
(4) Paralysis, any
body part
(5) Head or neck
fractures
(6) Head or face
scars or cuts
(7) Nerve damage, any
body part
(8) Burn entire body
(9) Death all non-mkt.
(10) Loss consortium

16,984

3.8

769,188

100.00

42

4.1

2,064

8.6

22,524

2.93

6.7

24,276

3.16

6.6

3,468

5.0

20,484

2.66

4.7

41,940

5.45

194
24
172
248

4.1
9,576
6.2
1,776
4.7
9,720
5.1
15,192
Total rows 1-10

1.24
.23
1.26
1.98
19.62

3,686
2,405
1,739
1,204
412
194

4.3
189,228
3.1
89,064
2.9
60,216
2.9
42,084
3.3
16,416
4.4
10,020
Total rows 11-16

24.60
11.58
7.83
5.47
2.13
1.30
52.91

Truly Routine Damages:
(11) Fractures*
(12) Strains, sprains
(13) Whiplash
(14) Bruises
(15) Cuts*
(16) Dislocations

44

*Not including head and neck fractures
"*Not including head and facial cuts
Source: Derived by author from Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter.
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cases among those of row 3 involving amputation of a finger or a
finger-digit, or of the 14 cases of row 4 involving claims of shoulder
paralysis.
Row 3 shows that, in aggregate, all claims regarding amputation of a body part or loss of an organ required 3.16 percent of
juror time. Row 4 indicates that paralysis cases, in sum, required
.45 percent of civil jury time, and row 5, that head and neck fractures required 2.66 percent. Row 6 shows that the more voluminous category of scars or cuts to the head and face required 5.45
percent of juror time.
Row 7 presents all cases involving any claim of nerve damage.
Again, this category is surely overinclusive of issues involving complex or conflicting societal evaluations; over 20 percent of juror
time in nerve damage cases, for example, involved claims of some
form of nerve damage to one hand or one arm. Nerve damage
cases, in aggregate, required 1.24 percent of total juror time. Rows
8-10 reproduce figures from Table 1 for serious burns (.23 percent),
deaths to non-market participants (1.26 percent), and loss of consortium (1.98 percent).
Finally, below row 10, I have added the proportion of jury
time spent on all of the injury categories that might conceivably
implicate complex or conflicting societal values with respect to
damages calculation. Again, this total acknowledges that the categories have been defined overinclusively to sketch the outer bound
of juror responsibility for complex value determinations. In sum,
jurors in Chicago spent 19.62 percent of time on complex value
damages judgments.
By contrast, rows 11 through 16 present the time spent by the
civil jury determining damages at the other end of the injury spectrum: truly routine injuries. For consistency, these categories, too,
were expanded beyond the categories of the single most frequent
injuries presented in Table 2. Thus, row 11 includes-besides the
leg, back, arm and foot fractures of Table 2-all cases involving
bone fractures other than of the head and neck. Similarly, row 12
includes all strains and sprains; row 14, all bruises; row 15, all cuts
except for cuts to the head and face, and row 16, all dislocations.
Row 13, for convenience, reproduces the whiplash results from Table 2.
This half of the Table shows that civil juries spent 24.60 percent of time measuring damages in fracture cases, over one and
one-quarter as much time as the total for rows 1-10. Row 12 shows
that jurors spent 11.58 percent of time in cases in which strains or
sprains were the most serious reported injury. Indeed, if the whip-
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lash total (row 13) is added to the total for strains and sprains, the
sum is only slightly less (19.41 percent) than the total for all injuries arguably implicating complex value judgments. The remaining
rows show that Chicago juries spent large amounts of time on even
more routine injuries: 5.47 percent evaluating bruises; 2.13 percent
on cuts; and 1.30 percent on dislocations.
This Table shows that the civil jury in Chicago spent overwhelming portions of its time evaluating truly routine injuries. To
focus the comparison, the civil jury spent 12 times as much time
on bruises as on paralysis, and about four times as much on strains
and sprains as on all catastrophic injuries. The civil jury spent
more time on cases in which the most serious claimed injury was a
dislocation than on all cases involving death to non-market participants. The most frequently litigated injury, fractures, required 96
times as much time as libel and slander; 55 times as much as paralysis; 19 times as much as death to non-market participants; eight
times as much as catastrophic injury; and seven times as much as
amputation of a body part or loss of an organ.
Compare in aggregate the two ends of the injury spectrum: the
civil jury spent 19.62 percent of its time in damages evaluations
arguably involving complex or conflicting societal values. In contrast, adding together all cases reported in rows 11-16, the civil
jury spent 52.91 percent of its time on routine injuries.
B. The Civil Jury's Burden in Cases Implicating
Governmental Power
This section addresses the work of the civil jury in terms of
the substantive liability decisions it is called upon to make. As described above, the second principal justification of the civil jury is
its role, like that of the criminal jury, as a democratic counterforce
to the state in actions that implicate the exercise of governmental
power. Though there has been little effort in the civil jury literature to specify precisely the character of disputes for which the
civil jury might serve this role, I have attempted in Table 4 to collect all cases fitting this description. Rows 1-4 present all cases involving direct exercise of the police power. In rows 5-12, I expand
the definition of governmental power to include all cases in which
some governmental unit was a party to the litigation.
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Table 4: Juror Time in Governmental Power Cases
Cook County, Illinois, 1959-79
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Casetype

# Cases

Mean
Trial
Length,
Days

Total
Juror
Days

Percent
of
Grand
Total

All Cases

16,984

3.8

769,188

100.00

39

3.3

1,536

.20

102

3.4

4,200

.55

8

3.6

348

.05

19

5.6

1,284

.17

(1) . Malicious prosecution
(2)

False arrest

(3)

False imprisonment

(4)

Assault by police

Governmental Litigation:
Government as defendant:
(categories overlap)
(5)

Police officer

75

4.5

4,056

.53

(6)

Police Dept.

30

5.6

2,016

.26

(7)

Fire Dept.

17

4.5

924

.12

(8)

Private Security Guard

21

4.6

1,164

.15

(9)

All City of Chicago

425

4.4

22,308

2.90

11

3.5

468

.06

4

8.5

408

.05

14

3.8

636

.08

(10) All Cook County
(11) All State of Illinois
* Government as plaintiff:
(12) All govt. as plaintiff

Source: Derived by author from Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter.
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Row 1 shows that claims of malicious prosecution required
1536 juror days, equal to .20 percent of total juror time."9 Rows 2
and 3 indicate that cases involving claims of false arrest and false
imprisonment required .55 and .05 percent of total juror time, respectively. Row 4 shows cases in which the plaintiff claimed that
he or she had been assaulted by a police officer. These cases required .17 percent of civil juror time.
Though the most prevalent and persuasive justification of the
civil jury as a democratic counterforce focuses on the casetypes
presented in rows 1-4, civil jury decisionmaking is arguably appropriate for any case in which some governmental agency is an adverse party to a citizen. Rows 5-11 present cases in which a citizenplaintiff has sued any governmental employee or agency as a defendant. Row 8 presents suits against private security guards. Here
the democratic features of the jury are arguably less crucial, but I
have included the category because of the police-like character of
the underlying dispute.
The figures in rows 5-11 overstate total governmental litigation-perhaps substantially-because they overlap. In many cases,
citizen-plaintiffs sue more than one governmental entity in the
same case. As an example, there is substantial overlap between
rows 5 and 6, involving suits against an individual police officer as
well as the police department instructing or monitoring the officer.
Note that rows 5-11 include virtually all of the cases reported
above in rows 1-4.7 °
Row 5 shows that suits against police officers comprised .53
percent of civil jury time. Rows 6 and 7 indicate that suits against
police and fire departments required .26 and .12 percent of juror
time, respectively. Row 8 shows that civil juries in Chicago spent
.15 percent of time resolving suits against private security guards.
Rows 9-11 present claims against broader political entities: the
City of Chicago, Cook County and the State of Illinois. These suits,
typically, are brought for injuries suffered on poorly maintained
sidewalks or streets, in public parks or in forest preserves. It is not
at all obvious that the political content of a typical pothole case or
a slip-and-fall at a streetcorner should compel the convening of a
69 The malicious prosecution and false arrest categories are overinclusive. Although

such actions are most typically brought against the police, some are brought against institutions like stores or restaurants that summon the police or other governmental actors against
private citizens.
7' The only possible exception is suits for false arrest or malicious prosecution against
private parties in which the police were not joined as defendants.
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representative, discontinuous, aresponsible adjudicative institution, but I include them to sketch the upper bound of governmental power cases. Suits against the City of Chicago required almost 3
percent of juror time (row 9); against Cook County, .06 percent
(row 10); and against the State, .05 percent (row 11). Finally, Row
12 sums all civil cases referred to juries in which a governmental
plaintiff has sued a citizen-defendant;7 1 between 1959 and 1979,
such cases required .08 percent of juror time.
Once again, the striking feature of Table 4 is the infrequency
of occasions on which a civil jury is compelled to resolve cases involving the exercise of governmental power. Cases involving claims
of malicious prosecution, false arrest or imprisonment, and assault
by a police officer required, in aggregate, only .97 percent of civil
jury time. Cases in which some governmental employee or agency
was a party-litigant, again in aggregate, required only 4.15 percent
of civil jury time. At the maximum, if we add all malicious prosecution and false arrest cases to the governmental party
cases-again, surely an overstatement 72-the
total is only 4.9
percent.
On which types of disputes does the civil jury spend more of
its time? Table 5 shows those casetypes from the data that required the greatest proportion of civil jury effort. I have segregated
the case categories as narrowly as the data will allow so as not to
exaggerate the figures. Row 1 shows that civil juries spent 22.57
percent of their time, equal to 173,616 days (694 juror years), on
cases involving auto collisions at intersections. Row 2 shows that
rear-end auto collision cases required 15.06 percent of total civil
jury time, equal to 115,824 juror days (463 juror years). Suits by
pedestrians hit by autos required 9.64 percent of juror time (row
3); guest actions, 4.12 percent (row 4); head-on collision cases, 3.24
percent (row 5); and collisions between autos and motorcycles or
bicycles, 2.37 percent (row 6). Just below row 6, I have summed all
auto accident cases. In aggregate, civil juries in Chicago spent 63.17
percent of total time resolving auto accident cases. This juror investment is equal to 485,904 juror days, or 1943 juror years.

7'

This category includes the two condemnation cases tried to juries during the relevant

period.
2 See text accompanying note 70.
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Table 5: Juror Time in Most Frequent Casetypes,
Cook County, Illinois, 1959-79
(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Casetype

# Cases

Mean
Trial
Length,
Days

Total
Juror
Days

Percent
of
Grand
Total

All Cases

16,984

3.8

769,188

100.00

(1)

Auto collision
intersection

4,352

173,616

22.57

(2)

Auto rear-end

2,968

115,824

15.06

(3)

Auto-pedestrian

1,552

74,112

9.64

(4)

Auto, guest action

688

31,728

4.12

(5)

Auto head-on

492

24,912

3.24

(6)

Auto-cycle

408

18,240

2.37

Total Auto

11,545

3.5

485,904

63.17

(7)

Action against
property owner

1,613

3.8

73,020

9.49

(8)

Job-site, 3d-party
action

767

5.7

52,488

6.82

Product Liability

553

6.0

39,876

5.18

(10) Common carrier
alighting-jerking

585

3.3

23,424

3.05

(11)

328'

5.7

22,380

2.91

(9)

Malpractice

Source: Derived by author from Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter.

186

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1990:

Finally, rows 7-11 show the other principal liability categories
of the civil jury workload. The civil jury spent 9.49 percent of this
time resolving suits against property owners (for instance,
landlord-tenant and slip-and-fall cases) (row 7); 6.82 percent,
worker suits against third-party defendants (row 8); 5.18 percent,
products liability suits (row 9); 3.05 percent, suits against the Chicago Transit Authority for injuries incurred in alighting a bus or
an elevated train or because of jerking while in transit (row 10);
and 2.91 percent, malpractice actions (row 11).
A comparison of Tables 4 and 5 shows a striking difference
between the relative investment of civil juror effort in cases involving governmental power and in more routine societal disputes. The
civil jury spends 75 times as much time on disputes involving rearend collisions as on disputes involving malicious prosecution, 24
times as much on auto guest actions as on assaults by the police,
and 65 times as much on head-on collisions as on claims of false
imprisonment. Indeed, the magnitudes of these differences are astounding. The civil jury spends over 15 times as much time on auto
accident cases alone as on the aggregate of cases in which any governmental agency or employee is a party to the litigation.
Even in absolute terms, the numbers are overwhelming. In
terms of juror years, over the 21-year period of the sample, the
civil jury spent almost seven centuries resolving cases involving
auto collisions at intersections; over four and one-half centuries
resolving rear-end collisions; over a century and a quarter on auto
guest actions. Almost incredibly, the civil jury spent almost two
millennia, 1943 juror years, on aggregate auto accident cases.
The role of the civil jury as a democratic counterforce in cases
implicating governmental power was trivial in comparison, suggesting that the occasions upon which civil juries are actually employed in a political role are very limited in our society. Although
the period of the sample, 1959-79, perhaps understates the current
extent of suits against government agencies, especially because I
report only state court and not section 1983 federal decisions, the
comparison is extraordinary. Twenty-one years of false arrest, false
imprisonment and assault actions against the police required no
more than 16.8, 1.4, and 5.1 juror years, respectively. At the maximum, cases implicating governmental power in the aggregate (Table 4, rows 1, 2, 5-12) required less than eight percent of the juror
time invested in auto accident cases.
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C.

Civil Jury Service as Civic Education

The third principal justification for the institution of the civil
jury is the practical instruction jury service provides in the operation of the rule of law in a democratic society. As is well-known,
the educative effects of jury service were invoked at the country's
founding in support both of the Seventh Amendment and of those
state constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right to a civil jury.73
Perhaps more importantly, the civil jury experience was later celebrated as central to the political genius of American society in
Tocqueville's highly influential study of the United States. 74 Indeed, in the civil jury literature over the years, the educative function of the civil jury has come to trump effectively any jury skepticism, perhaps because the postulated product of jury
experience-increased civic responsibility-can be thought to be of
nearly infinite value in a democracy. Whatever the reason, there
has been little effort over the years either to measure with any precision how jury service alters commitment to democracy, or to
compare jury service to other civic experiences or to other educational mechanisms for improving citizenship.
There surely are no data available to evaluate the extent to
which civil jury experience enhances civic responsibility. But it is
possible to examine the magnitude of the effect. Based upon observations from his travels about America in the early 1830s,
Tocqueville reported that civil jury responsibility was just frequent
enough to educate all American citizens, but not so frequent as to
become burdensome."' According to Tocqueville, "[t]he jurors being very numerous, each citizen's turn to serve hardly comes more
than once in three years. ' 76 Put in reduced form, in Tocqueville's
time the probability of an average citizen serving on a civil jury
during any one year was somewhere between .25 and .33.
Table 6 presents comparable figures for citizens in Chicago
during the period *1959 to 1979. Column 1 shows the number of
jury trials in Cook County during each year, and column 2 the
number of sitting jurors. Although a recent account has emphasized that large numbers of citizens have at some time been called

" See,

generally, Carrington, 1990 U Chi Legal F 33 (cited in note 13).

"4Tocqueville, Democracy in America at 270-76 (cited in note 2). See text accompanying notes 51-52.
71 Id at 729, App I.
76 Id.
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for jury service,7 7 it is unclear that merely reporting for service
provides civic education equivalent to actual deliberation and
judgment. Thus, column 2 reports the number of jurors actually
rendering a verdict. According to Max Sonderby, founder of the
Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter, during the years reported
here, individual jurors served for a two-week period. During the
early years, Sonderby reports, it was not uncommon for a single
individual to serve on more than one jury, though during the later
years service on a jury would excuse a citizen from further service.
To err on the high side, I neglect multiple service.
In Cook County, civil jurors are chosen from the list of registered voters. Column 3 presents the number of registered voters
during each year, constituting the pool of available jurors. 78 Finally, Column 4 derives the probability of civil jury service by dividing, for each year, the number of jurors (column 2) by the number of registered voters (column 3). Thus, for example, in 1959,
6408 of the 2,418,907 registered Cook County voters served on civil
juries. Each voter faced a probability of .0026 of jury service, equal
to service once every 377.5 years. Similarly, in 1960,-5844 of the
2,653,804 Cook County voters served on juries, equal to an annual
probability of service of .0022, or a chance of service once every
454.1 years. Because I ignore multiple jury service, the probabilities of civil jury service reported in column 4 are overestimates.
Table 6 makes clear that the magnitude of the educative effect
of civil jury service has changed substantially since Tocqueville's
account. Citizens may have served on juries once every three or
four years in the 1830s, but today, in urban jurisdictions like Chicago, their opportunities for civic education are dramatically lower.
For the years of study, Table 6 shows that Chicago voters faced the
greatest likelihood of civil jury service in 1968: .0054, equal to service once every 186.7 years. On average for the 21-year period, Chicago jurors faced an annual probability of civil jury service of
.0038, equal to service once every 260.2 years. Those extremely diligent citizens who register to vote during each of their years of eligibility face a probability of serving on a civil jury of roughly eight

7' Stephen J. Adler and Wade Lambert, More Americans are Called for Jury Duty,
Wall St J B8 (July 10, 1990) (reporting Defense Research Institute study claiming 45 percent of U.S. adults have been called at least once for jury duty, though only 17 percent have
ever begun a trial).
78 1 am grateful to Donna McNamara of the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners
and Peter J. Johnen, Chief of Administrative Services for the Chief Judge, Circuit Court of
Cook County, for compiling these data.
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Table 6: Jury Service as a Civic Experience
Cook County, Illinois, 1959-79

1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

Jury Trials"

Total
Jurors*

Registered
Voters* **

534*
487
583
614
1,045
914
849
1,078
1,121
1,175
928
915
1,041
894
892
820
861
691
627
746
581"

6,408
5,844
6,996
7,368
12,540
10,968
10,188
12,936
13,452
14,100
11,136
10,980
12,492
10,728
10,704
9,840
10,332
8,292
7,524
8,952
6,972

2,418,907
2,653,804
2,552,014
2,430,107
2,414,834
2,663,693
2,663,693
2,506,298
2,522,560
2,633,036
2,562,160
2,444,841
2,455,047
2,810,618
2,810,618
2,548,280
2,574,454
2,703,176
2,865,174
2,530,253
2,554,118

Probability
Jury
Service/yr.
.0026
.0022
.0027
.0030
.0052
.0041
.0038
.0052
.0053
.0054
.0043
.0045
.0051
.0038
.0038
.0039
.0040
.0031
.0026
.0035
.0027

Average 1959-79 .0038
*Extrapolated from part year results.

Sources:

Derived by 'author from Cook County Jury Verdict
Reporter.
Derived by author from Chicago and Cook County
Boards of Election Commissioners. See note 78.
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percent by age 40, 16 percent by age 60 and 20 percent at some
9
point during their lifetime.
The striking feature of Table 6, however, is how relatively few
citizens experience the civic educational effect of jury service. Cook
County is one of the largest metropolitan areas in the United
States; its total population during the years of study exceeded five
million.8 0 Yet on average, less than 10,000 citizens per year served
on civil juries. In the year of the greatest number of trials, 1968,
only 14,100 citizens served on civil juries.
Of course, there is every reason to believe that the civic training from jury service will have an impact beyond that on actual
jurors themselves, as citizens relate their jury experiences to family
and friends. But even if we imagine that this ripple effect triples
the educative effects of jury service, still no more than 40,000 Chicago citizens in any year were beneficiaries of this civic education,
a number that constitutes only 1.5 percent of the average number
of registered voters and .76 percent of the Cook County
population.
Finally, proponents of the civil jury have tended to regard all
jury service as equivalent in terms of the civic education that it
provides. It is worthwhile in this regard, however, to reconsider the
allocation of civil jury responsibility shown earlier in Tables 1-5. It
is not clear that, regardless of subject matter, all disputes possess
identical educative opportunities in the civic virtues.
Surely the strongest case for jury service as civic education can
be made for disputes involving exercise of the police power: false
arrest or imprisonment, assault by a police officer, malicious prosecution, and possibly condemnation actions. As shown in Table 4,
however, these cases comprise only .97 percent of civil juror time.
An argument, though less strong, can be raised that jurors learn
about civic responsibility from all cases in which a governmental
entity is a party. Again, this position seems strained with respect
to pothole and slip-and-fall cases in public parks. Still, Table 4
shows that adding these disputes to the police power disputes
totals to no more than 4.9 percent of aggregate juror time. Similarly, disputes categorized as implicating complex or conflicting societal values would appear to provide some form of civic education.

7' For the continental United States from 1959 to 1980, the life expectancy for those
reaching age 20 was roughly 51 years for males and 58 years for females. 1988 Statistical
Abstract of the United States 71, Table 107.
0 According to the U.S. Census, the population of Cook County in 1960 was 5.13 million; in 1970, 5.49 million; and in 1980, 5.25 million.
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Many of these cases involve the evaluation of enormous pain and
suffering-perhaps heart-rending, even tragic-but are more educative of the vagaries of life than of the role of a citizen in a
democracy.
Yet, as shown earlier, even if all of these disputes are conceded
to provide civic education, they comprise less than 25 percent of
the burden of the jury. Measured in terms of numbers of jurors
sitting on such cases, rather than in terms of aggregate time, an
average of only 1755 jurors per year deliberated on disputes involving governmental power or complex societal values."1 Even tripling
this number to account for the ripple effect on friends and relatives, no more than 5265 Cook County citizens in any year were
beneficiaries of the civic education function of civil jury service.
This equals .2 percent of the average number of registered voters
and only .1 percent of the Cook County population. Converted to
life expectancy, Chicago citizens registered to vote during every
year of eligibility face between a five and six percent chance during
their lifetimes of serving on a jury in a civil dispute involving governmental power or complex societal values.
III.

IMPLICATIONS: THE JURY AND CIVIL TRIAL DELAY

Most important among the findings regarding the work of the
modern civil jury are not the specific proportions of time spent
resolving cases involving intersection collisions or single broken
legs. The civil courts of Chicago may well differ from the courts of
other jurisdictions in terms of the comparative proportions of cases
involving traffic accidents versus worker injuries, or bruises versus
fractures. Surely, in all jurisdictions the number of cases reaching
juries is influenced by the underlying volume of specific accidents
and injuries flowing from the activities of its citizens. Rather, the
single most important finding of Tables 1-5 is the sheer magnitude
of cases involving routine accidents and injuries that reach civil
juries. The Chicago experience suggests that, though proportions
and specific casetypes may differ across jurisdictions, civil juries in
the U.S. are saddled with an extraordinary burden of resolving the
routine.8 2
It is not readily apparent that the institution of the civil jury
is well-designed for such cases. Again, for disputes implicating
81 Derived from Tables 3 and 4, column 2.
82 See text accompanying notes 96-102 (discussing the determinants of routine versus

difficult litigation and whether Chicago is likely to differ from other jurisdictions in this
respect).
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complex or conflicting societal values or for disputes with political
content, one may defend the idea of decision by a group of twelve
rather than one; of laypersons rather than professionals; of persons
chosen randomly from the population, who sit discontinuously and
decide aresponsibly, without explanation and largely beyond appellate review.
It is considerably more difficult to justify these various institutional features of the civil jury for the resolution of routine litigation. For example, in contexts of commonplace auto litigation or
routine injuries, why is it appropriate to insist upon decision by
laypersons rather than professionals, or to choose those persons
randomly from the population? What purpose is served by providing for discontinuous decisionmaking, dispersing the finders of fact
after a single decision? What is added to the concept of the rule of
law by aresponsibility: allowing decisions to be rendered by a randomly chosen group without explanation or justification and,
moreover, reversing such decisions only in cases of extreme error?
These various characteristics of the civil jury may be appropriate
for cases implicating complex or conflicting societal values or difficult political conflicts, but it is difficult to justify them for the resolution of the broad range of routine litigation faced by the modern civil jury.
Issues of this nature have not been widely discussed in the
jury literature. Of course, heretofore there has been little precise
information available showing the extent to which routine litigation dominates the civil jury caseload. Perhaps more importantly,
there has been a sense in the literature that any limitations of the
jury as a decisionmaking institution are outweighed by the benefits
from the civic training of jury service, either as benefits to society
as emphasized by Tocqueville, or as individual benefits as shown
from juror polls. Regrettably, we have learned that the magnitude
of civic training that derives from jury service is minimal. The proportion of the population in a major urban jurisdiction that can
ever be expected to serve on a jury, or to learn vicariously from
another's service, is very small.
The discovery of the magnitude of routine litigation burdening
the civil jury, however, begins to suggest that there may be substantial societal costs from the current institutional design of the
civil jury. A society committed to the rule of law must be concerned about the accountability of decisions rendered by random
groups of citizens. Of even clearer concern is the link between the
current methods of civil jury case selection and the recurrent problem of civil litigation delay. As is well known, litigation delay in
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the U.S. chiefly afflicts civil jury calendars. 3 In the Chicago courts
during the period of study, for example, the average time from suit
to trial was 4.71 years, and from incident to trial, 5.68 years."' In
the ten years since, civil jury delay in Chicago has increased
substantially.8 5
As described earlier, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel were
deeply troubled by the delay attending the civil jury calendar.8 ,
Seeking some practical solution, they analyzed the problem by estimating the extent to which substitution of judge for jury decisionmaking would reduce trial length and affect the pretrial settlement process. Kalven and Zeisel recognized early that they could
obtain no good empirical data on comparative judge-jury trial
length, because it was likely that the cases reaching the bench and
the cases assigned to jury trials were fundamentally different. 7 In
an attempt to estimate the difference, however, they polled plaintiffs' attorneys, defense attorneys and judges, and concluded that,
on average, the same case would take 40 percent longer if tried to a
jury than if tried to a judge. 8 They conceded that a 40 percent
time difference was significant, but argued that an identical time
savings could be achieved either by adding new judges or by implementing procedural reforms to preserve full civil jury jurisdiction.
Kalven and Zeisel also saw that civil jury delay could be reduced if litigants waived their right to a jury trial more frequently.
They considered various procedural and substantive changes in the
law that would create incentives to increase jury waivers, but rejected them all.90 To find a solution, they again polled lawyers to
See, for example, Thomas Church, Jr., et al, Justice Delayed: The Pace of Litigation
in Urban Trial Courts Tables 2.1, 2.4 (NCSC, 1978) (showing jury delay roughly four to five
times greater in civil than criminal courts).
84 Priest, 69 BU L Rev at 532 (cited in note 18).
15 According to Max Sonderby of the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter, the current
suit-to-trial delay in Chicago is over six years. Telephone interview with Sonderby, July 13,
1990. For a recent reaction to the increase in delay in Chicago, see note 22.
8" See text accompanying notes 16-20.
81 Hans Zeisel, Harry Kalven, Jr., and Bernard Buchholz, Delay in the Court 72-74
(Little, Brown & Co., 1959).
13

88 Id at 76-79.
89 Id at 82-86.

Kalven and Zeisel, of course, had strong personal commitments to retaining the jury system. See, generally, Kalven, 50 Va L Rev 1055 (cited in note 4); Kalven &
Zeisel, The American Jury (cited in note 1); Zeisel, 328 Ann Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 46
(cited in note 16).
90 Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz, Delay in the Court at 87-93. Kalven and Zeisel rejected
additional fees for jury trials as inconsistent with the basic right. They also addressed the
adoption of a comparative negligence standard that some had proposed to reduce the substantive difference between judge and jury decisionmaking by preventing judges from rigorously applying the contributory negligence doctrine, in contrast to more equitable juries
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determine the motivations for jury waivers, and this time discovered a paradox: 43 percent of the lawyers polled explained that
they had waived their client's right to a jury trial because of the
extent of civil jury delay. From this finding Kalven and Zeisel concluded that increasing jury waivers could have little ultimate effect
on the delay problem because, to the extent greater numbers of
waivers reduced delay, the reduced delay would reduce the number
of waivers."1
There are serious shortcomings, however, to the Kalven-Zpisel
analysis of the effect of the prospect of jury trial on litigation delay. Polling individual lawyers about settlement decisions can
never explain the full reasons why cases proceed to trial, because
individual polling fails to take account of the reciprocal nature of
litigation-settlement and bench-jury trial decisions.92 Disputes are
settled rather than litigated, or brought before a judge rather than
a jury not by the choice of one party alone, but only through what
might be called a "cooperative" decision of the parties. To understand the effect of the right to a jury trial on delay, it is necessary
to understand the conditions under which litigants are more or less
likely to reach such cooperative decisions. 3
Under the American system of civil procedure, trial by jury is
at the election of either plaintiff or defendant. Disputes will be referred to the civil jury calendar whenever either litigant believes
that decision by a jury will be more favorable than decision by a
judge. Conversely, the only cases that will not be referred to the
civil jury calendar are cases in which both parties believe that decision by a judge will be more favorable than decision by a jury.
Since the parties' individual preferences for trial by judge must
necessarily derive from competing reasons, it should not be surprising that in most jurisdictions overwhelming proportions of civil
cases are referred to the jury calendar. 4

thought to enter compromise judgments. They rejected this reform, however, because of the
ambiguity as to whether plaintiffs would be made better or worse off by comparative negligence. Id at 90-91.
' Id at 64-65, 89. In an earlier treatment of the delay problem, I did not fully appreciate the Kalven-Zeisel point mentioned here. See, generally, Priest, 69 BU L Rev 527 (cited
in note 18).
2 Lawyer polls also fail to account for more subtle effects of delay on decisionmaking,
such as the effect on negotiations from changes in the expected value of the stakes of the
case. For an elaboration of this point, see Priest, 69 BU L Rev at 536.
" For an introduction to this approach, see sources cited in note 24.
"' For estimates of the proportion of judge versus jury litigation, see Zeisel, Kalven &
Buchholz, Delay in the Court at 88 (cited in note 87).
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Reference to the civil jury calendar, however, is only the first
step. The most important determinant of the cases that actually
reach civil juries for decision is the success of the parties' settlement negotiations prior to trial. By far the largest majority of civil
disputes are settled prior to trial rather than litigated. In the Cook
County courts during the period of study, for example, typically
only two to four percent of disputes were ever tried to juries.9 5 All
the rest were settled on terms mutually more favorable to the parties than undergoing the expense of actual civil trial.
Disputes will be settled or litigated depending upon whether
the difference in the parties' settlement offers is greater or less
than the combined costs of trial. 6 The difference in the parties'
settlement offers will be determined by the stakes of the case and
by the parties' predictions of the outcome. 7 Thus, of cases on the
jury calendar, those most likely to proceed to trial will be those for
which the stakes are very high and those for which there is the
greatest uncertainty as to how a jury will decide.
This method of choosing trial versus settlement presents a
much different picture of delegation to the civil jury than might be
imagined from the traditional literature justifying the institution.
In our system of private litigation, disputes are delegated to civil
juries for decision not on the ground that the jury is the most appropriate decisionmaking institution because the disputes implicate complex societal values or political issues. Rather, disputes are
delegated to the civil jury because the parties' settlement offers diverge. Parties' settlement offers diverge, in turn, because the underlying uncertainty over the outcome overwhelms the potential
savings in litigation costs.
Note that the large personal injury caseload of the civil jury
does not result from the simple fact that juries are likely to be
more sympathetic than judges toward injured victims.9 8 An expectation of relatively greater jury than judge sympathy will surely
lead the plaintiff to place the case on the civil jury calendar. But
the litigation-settlement decision is necessarily a cooperative one.
Defendants are equally aware of jury sympathy. Large volumes of
routine personal injury cases reach juries because parties have dif-

Priest, 69 BU L Rev at 540, Table 1.
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J L & Econ 61 (1971).
9" For a more precise description of the trial-settlement decision process, see Priest &
Klein, 13 J Legal Stud 1 (cited in note 24).
98 Holding other factors constant, however, any institutional feature that increases the
chance of plaintiff's success will increase the likelihood of litigation by increasing the expected value of the case to both parties.
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ferent expectations about the extent of jury sympathy; thus their
settlement demands and offers diverge, and they fail to settle the
case.
What determines the relative caseload mix across jurisdictions? Of course, in all jurisdictions, disputes will arise that involve
issues of sufficient importance to the parties that settlement is not
available on any terms.9 9 For all other disputes, however, the chief
determinants of settlement versus trial are the stakes of the case,
uncertainty over the outcome and litigation costs. Disputes involving very high stakes, as well as disputes involving complex legal or
factual issues, are likely to be pressed to trial because of consequent differences in settlement offers. Cases involving routine injuries (and thus routine damages) or routine accidents (and thus routine issues of liability) are far more likely to be settled because
differences-in the expected outcome are likely to be less. For routine cases to proceed to trial, levels of uncertainty in outcomes
must be exceedingly high.
Why then do so many cases involving routine accidents and
injuries reach juries in Chicago? The Chicago courts are dominated
by routine litigation because the difficulty of predicting how Chicago juries will decide these cases makes it impossible for the parties to agree on a settlement amount to save litigation costs. Is
Chicago likely to differ from other jurisdictions in terms of the volume of routine civil jury litigation? Under the American system of
unconstrained jury election, jurisdictions will differ in terms of
routine cases only as they differ in terms of the stakes of cases, the
predictability of jury decisions or the magnitude of litigation costs.
There is little reason to believe that litigation costs are differentially lower in Chicago to justify an exaggerated level of routine
litigation. There is equally little reason to believe that Chicago is
atypical in terms of stakes. Indeed, since trial delay encourages
settlement by reducing the present value of disputes, and since the
1 00
Chicago courts are among the most congested in the country,
one would predict that Chicago would have a lower proportion of
routine litigation than less congested jurisdictions.10 1 Chicago is

" Some, though probably not all, of political content litigation is of this character. For
example, the NAACP was not likely to settle Brown v Board of Education, though an individual citizen may be very willing to accept a monetary settlement from a police
department.
,01 See Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz, Delay in the Courts at xxi n 1 (cited in note 87);
Priest, 69 BU L Rev 527 (cited in note 18).
101 Id.
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only likely to differ from other jurisdictions in terms of routine
cases if Chicago juries are inherently less predictable.0 2
The source of the great volume of routine litigation is the institution of the civil jury itself. The civil jury is an engine of uncertainty. Each of the principal institutional characteristics of the
civil jury impairs the efforts of private litigants to settle and leads
to the dominance of routine disputes among the civil jury caseload.
Decision by lay citizens rather than professionals increases the uncertainty of outcome. Random selection of citizens increases the
uncertainty of outcome. The discontinuous nature of decision by
any single jury and the failure of the jury to explain or justify its
decision precludes a careful estimate of the outcome based upon
past behavior and, thus, increases the uncertainty of outcome. One
may readily endorse the idea that it is crucial for our democratic
system to convene a group composed of twelve citizens, chosen
randomly from the population, sitting discontinuously rather than
professionally, and deciding aresponsibly, for the resolution of disputes involving conflicting societal values or political issues. But
each of these characteristics is antagonistic to the private resolution of routine disputes.
The extensive civil trial delay in Chicago necessarily derives
from the large volume of disputes involving routine accidents and
injuries that proceeds to trial. Large urban jurisdictions like Chicago are characterized by an enormous inflow of civil litigation that
must ultimately be processed through a narrow bottleneck of civil
juries. For example, during the period of study, over 41,000 cases
on average, remained pending each year on the civil jury calendar,
with over 10,000 new cases filed each year. 10 3 As shown in Table 6,
Chicago civil juries were able to process on average roughly 800 of
these cases per year. All the rest of the cases either had to settle
out of court or wait for trial, generating the then-average 4.71
years suit-to-trial period. Today, the problem is worse. In 1989 in
Cook County, over 67,000 cases were pending on the civil jury calendar with 25,000 new cases filed during the year. The Cook
County courts were able to process only 728 jury trials.'0

ll

Chicago, of course, is a city with a diverse population. But more diverse than other

large cities? The question deserves further study.
'1 Derived from Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts,
1959-79.
104 1 am grateful to Max Sonderby and Rich Atkins of the Cook County Court Administrator's Office for these figures.
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An appreciation of these dynamics suggests why the focus of
the civil delay literature on case management reform, the addition
of judges or the alteration of "local legal culture,"1 0 5 is woefully
inadequate to the problem. Imagine that it were possible through
case management reform and reorientation of the legal culture to
increase the output of civil juries, say, 50 percent (frankly more
than any reformer could hope). Imagine further that, after implementing the management reforms, the legislature were convinced
to, say, double the number of sitting trial judges. 106 At current
rates, such reforms would triple the annual number of jury decisions from roughly 800 to 2400. But in 1989, there were over 67,000
cases pending and 25,000 new cases filed and placed on the civil
jury calendar during the year. In the face of such massive inflow,
an increase of 1600 in the outflow of jury trials would be barely
noticeable. It is implausible that either management reform or increases of the judiciary will ever solve the litigation delay problem
107
in urban jurisdictions like Chicago.
These aggregate numbers show how heavily dependent our
civil litigation system is on the private settlement of disputes. Indeed, although litigation delay in the Chicago courts of four to six
years may seem extreme, the delay is only as low as it is because 96
to 98 percent of disputes settle out of court. The only way to affect
significantly the level of litigation delay in a major urban jurisdiction like Chicago is to increase the rate of civil settlement.
The most promising prospect for reducing delay is constraining the jurisdiction of the civil jury. The institution of the
civil jury may be justified for litigation involving complex or conflicting societal values, political issues, or the government as a
party. If civil jury jurisdiction were limited to these categories of
cases-even if the categories were defined expansively-the problem of civil jury delay would be reduced dramatically. As shown
earlier, cases involving evaluation of complex or conflicting societal
damages-defined broadly-comprise, at the maximum, 19.62 percent of the civil jury caseload. Cases implicating governmental
power-again defined broadly-comprise at most 4.9 percent of
the civil jury caseload. Together these categories of cases comprise
less than one-quarter of the current civil jury burden. It follows
directly that, without change, our current jury apparatus could
See source cited in note 21.
For recommendations of this nature, see note 22.
107 1 disregard here the complicating effect that reducing delay reduces the extent of
settlement. See, generally, Priest, 69 BU L Rev 527 (cited in note 18).
105
100
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handle those cases with a dramatic reduction in the extent of litigation delay.1"8
Restricting the jurisdiction of the civil jury, however, would
not eliminate routine cases; it would only shift them from the jury
to the bench trial calendar. Thus there would be no point to the
change unless there were reasons to believe that it would reduce
delay. There are strong reasons, however, to think that it would.
Kalven and Zeisel estimated that trial by judge is 40 percent faster
than trial by jury,109 but this effect is hardly the most important.
The principal benefit from shifting routine litigation from the civil
jury to the bench calendar is that the shift is likely to increase
dramatically the settlement rate.
For purposes of evaluating the effect of the civil jury on trial
delay, the important issue is not whether judges process cases more
rapidly than juries, but whether the prospect of trial by judge will
make the outcome of the dispute more predictable than the prospect of trial by jury. To the extent that parties are better able to
predict the outcome of disputes tried to judges, the disputes are
more likely to be settled rather than pressed to trial and the backlog of pending lawsuits will decline.
Each of the differences between the characteristics of the civil
jury and the civil judge suggest that the shift of routine litigation
to the judicial calendar will increase predictability and promote
settlement. The judge is a professional, not a lay citizen. The judge
sits continuously, and his or her previous decisions-especially if
accompanied by written or oral opinion explaining and justifying
them-will provide a guide for the prediction of future decisions.
It follows necessarily that the prospect of decision by judge will
increase settlements and reduce trials.
Some commentators have disparaged the civil settlement process, extolling the societal values of authoritative judge or jury
decisionmaking." 0 These values are surely important. But in the
context of a judicial system that in 1989 was burdened with 67,000
pending cases, upon which 25,000 new cases were filed, the conception that all disputes should be tried to a verdict is unrealistic. Our
society necessarily must rely on the private settlement process for
the resolution of civil litigation. Restricting the jurisdiction of the
civil jury to cases for which jury resolution can be defended-cases

This would be the case even where the rate of litigation versus settlement of such
cases increases because of the reduction in delay. See id.
109 See text accompanying note 88.
110 See, generally, Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L J. 1073 (1984).
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involving complex or conflicting societal values or political content-will reduce the extent of civil court congestion. There is little clear social purpose in convening twelve randomly chosen citizens to resolve a rear-end accident case in which the most serious
injury was a bruise or fracture. Litigants proceed to trial by jury in
routine cases not because of some individual or societal conception
that trial by jury will fulfill a fundamental social objective but because differences in their expectations of the jury's decision are too
great to allow them the settlement which they would most probably prefer.
Finally, the time has come to reanalyze the importance to a
modern society of the civic education provided by jury service.
When Tocqueville traveled around the country in the early decades following the Revolution, civil jury service may well have
contributed significantly to citizen identity with the nation and
commitment to its democratic management. At a time when a
functional democracy was a relatively new idea and there were few
existing sources of formal education, the experience of civil jury
service may have been a very effective mechanism for imparting
societal norms and for providing training in the operation of the
laws.
But times have surely changed. Democracy is no longer an unknown and little tried technique of political organization. There
are many existing sources for education in civic responsibility,
from our schools, in which it has become part of the traditional
elementary curriculum, to our modern communications media. The
pervasive effect of these institutions on civic consciousness was, of
course, inconceivable to Tocqueville.
Moreover, even if, in a metaphorical sense, civic responsibility
is of infinite value, a modern society must have some sense of proportion. Can it be justified to subject all of Cook County's litigants-the 67,000 with cases pending in 1989 and the 25,000 with
newly filed disputes"-to an average six year suit-to-trial delay in
order to provide direct civic education to 1755 citizens per year?
Clearly, it is the burden of those who celebrate unlimited jurisdiction of the civil jury to defend its role in light of its attendant trial
delay.

"' Note that the simple number of cases filed and pending ignores multiple plaintiffs,
and so is a substantial understatement. Moreover, the numbers ignore those who, discouraged by litigation delay and interested in getting on with their lives, decline to file suit and
suffer deprivations of rights without remedy.

